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Article 4

DEFENSES GOOD AGAINST PAST DUE
COMMERCIAL PAPER
Perhaps no one branch of the law of commercial paper
more mystifies the student and bewilders a non-legal student
and business man than the subject of defenses good against
overdue paper. This fact coupled with the present economic depression which has caused much commercial paper
to be defaulted are the principal reasons for the writer's
selection of overdue paper as the subject of this article.
At the outset it may be stated that the legal confusion
concerning defenses to which the purchaser of overdue paper
is subject is due to the failure of the courts to adopt a
single legal principle which would exclusively determine the
rights of such a purchaser. The failure to determine the
principle in turn is due to a failure on the part of the courts
to classify overdue paper as exclusively a chose in action to
be governed by the rules applicable to choses in action or
as an ordinary chattel to be governed by the rules applicable to chattels.
Before noting the question involved in the problem of
the correct classification of overdue paper either as a cause
of action or as a chattel, a brief historical sketch of the law
applicable to choses in action and chattels will be noted.
First as to choses in action: Perhaps no better brief outline of the historical development of the law of assignments
can be given than to quote Chitty, in his work on Bills of
Exchange:I
"The first peculiar privilege of a bill of exchange is its assignable
quality, and which is in direct opposition to a very ancient rule of
law, the founders of which refused to sanction or give effect to the
transfer of any possibility, right, or any other chose in action (which
is defined to be a right not reduced into possession) to a stranger; on
1
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the ground that such alienations tended to increase maintenance and
litigation, and afforded means to powerful men to purchase rights of
action, and thereby enable them to oppress indigent debtors, whose
original creditors would not perhaps have sued them. Our ancestors
were so anxious to prevent alienation of ckoses, or rights in action,
that we find it enacted by the 32 H.8. c. 9. (which, it is said, was in
affirmance of the common law,) that no person should buy or sell,
or by any means obtain any right or title to any manors, lands, tenements, or hereditaments, unless the person contracting to sell, or his
ancestor, or they by whom he or they claim the same, had been in
possession of the same, or of the reversion or remainder thereof for
the space of one year before the contract; and this statute was adjudged to extend to the assignment of a copyhold estate, and of a
chattel interest, as a lease for years, of land, whereof the grantor was
not in possession. At what time this doctrine, which, it is said, had
relation originally only to landed estates, was first adjudged to be
equally applicable to the assignment of a mere personal chattel not
in possession, it is not easy to decide: it seems, however, to have
been so settled at a very early period of our history, as the works
of our oldest text writers, and the reports, contain numberless observations and cases on the subject. Lord Coke says, that it is one
of the maxims of the common law, that no right of action cdn be
transferred, 'because, under color thereof pretended titles might be
granted to great men, whereby right might be trodden down, and the
weak oppressed, which the common law forbiddeth.' Accordingly we
find, that judgment was arrested in an action on a bond conditioned
for the performance of articles of agreement, which contained a covenant that the defendant should assign certain bonds to the plaintiff
for his own use, on the ground that such condition and covenant
amounted to maintenance. And although it was decided, that the king,
in respect of his prerogative, might transfer a right of action, yet it
was afterwards ruled, that his assignee had no such power.
"This doctrine, however strictly adhered to in our courts of law,
was not adopted by our courts of equity: for though it is said to have
been decided on the 11th James I, that the assignee of a covenant
could not sue in a court of equity to enforce performance, because it
was against law to assign a covenant, yet that seems to be an insulated case; and no other authority is to be found, where a court
of equity has refused to give effect to the assignment of a chose in
action, provided such assignment were made for a sufficient consideration. A court of equity having it in its power to decree according to
the justice of every case, there could have been no danger of maintenance being increased by its giving effect to such assignments; we
therefore find a great number of cases where decrees have been made
in favor of such assignees.
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"In courts of law the equitable interest of the assignee of a chose
in action seems to have been recognized as far back as the middle
of the last century, when we find it said by one of the judges, 'that if
an assignee of a chose in action have an equity, that equity should
be no exile to the courts of common law.' In another case also, the
court speaks of an assignment of an apprentice, or an assignment of
a bond, as things valid between the parties, and to which they must
give their sanction; and an assignment of a chose in action has always
been deemed a sufficient consideration for a promise, although the
debt assigned was uncertain. So indeed it was decided, that where the
obligee has assigned over a bond, and afterwards becomes a bankrupt,
he might nevertheless bring an action on the bond; and that in
an action upon a bond given to the plaintiff in trust for another,
the defendant may set off a debt due from the person beneficially
interested, in like manner, as if the action had been brought by the
cestui que trust. A debt assigned for the benefit of creditors, is not
liable to be attached for the debt of the assignor. But though courts
of law have gone the length of taking notice of assignments of choses
in action, and of giving effect to them, yet in almost every case they
have adhered to the formal objection that the action should be
brought in the name of the assignor, and not in the name of the
assignee; the consequence of which rule is, that the defendant may
give in evidence a release, declaration, or admission of the plaintiff
on the record, to defeat the action, although it be evident such plaintiff is but a mere trustee for a third person. It has been observed,
that the substance of the rule being done away, there can be no use
or convenience in preserving the shadow of it; for where a third person
is permitted to acquire the interest in a thing, whether he bring the
action in his own name or in the name of the assignor, does not seem
to affect the question of maintenance. However, in a subsequent case,
Lord Kenyon expressed his determination not to sanction the assignment of a chose in action, so as to allow the assignee to sue in his
own name. The consequence of this doctrine is, that if an instrument
which is not assignable at law, so as to pass the legal interest, be
indorsed by the person to whom it is payable to his agent to whom
he is indebted generally, without any specific appropriation, the agent,
in case of the death of the principal, will have no legal or equitable
interest in the instrument towards satisfaction of his debt, but must
restore it to the executor.
"Even at the earliest period of our history, the doctrine of relating
to the assignment of ckoses in action was found to be too great a
clog on commercial intercourse; an exception was therefore soon
allowed in favor of mercantile transactions. It was the observation
of the learned and elegant commentator on the English laws, that in
the infancy of trade, when the bulk of national wealth consisted of
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real property, our courts did not often condescend to regulate personalty; but, as the advantages arising from commerce were gradually
felt, they were anxious to encourage it by removing the restrictions
by which the transfer of interest in it was bound. On this ground,
the custom of merchants, whereby a foreign 'bill of exchange is assignable by the payee to a third person, so as to vest in him the legal
as well as the equitable interest therein, was recognized and supported
by our courts of justice in the fourteenth century; and the custom of
merchants, rendering an inland bill transferable, was established in
the seventeenth century. In short, our courts, anxiously attending
to the interests of the community, have in favor of commerce, adopted
a less technical mode of considering personalty than realty; and, in
support of commercial transactions, have established the law merchant,
which is a system peculiarly founded on the rules of equity, and
governed in all its parts by plain justice and good faith."

Chiitty also says:
"The various advantages which commerce derives from the use of
bills of exchange, have induced our courts of justice, and also most
foreign courts, to allow them certain peculiar privileges in order to
give full effect to their utility."

The one which concerns us is as follows:
".. . that although a bill of exchange is a chose in action, yet it
may be assigned so as to vest the legal as well as equitable interest
therein, in the indorsee or assignee and to entitle him to sue thereon
in his own name.
"This privilege is of most essential importance in various points
of view, and principally that a release by the drawer to the acceptor,
or a set-off or cross demand due from the former to the latter, cannot
affect the right of action of the payee or indorsee; because the legal
and not the mere equitable interest is vested in,such payee or inaorsee,
and the action is sustainable in his own name; whereas suits upon
bonds, and most other choses in action, must be in the name of the
original obligee; and though it be apparent that he sues merely as a
trustee for another to whom he has assigned his interest, yet a release
from him, or a set-off due from him to the obligor, may be an
effectual bar to the action."

Although we may earnestly question the reason for the
rule against inalienability of choses in action by Mr. Chitty,
the rule itself is unquestionable. The reasons given by
Dean Ames in his lecture on The Inalienability of Choses
in Action,' are now accepted:
2
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"There were, however, a few exceptions to the rule. The king, as
might be supposed, could grant or receive the benefit of a chose in
action. So, too, a reversion or a remainder was transferable by fine
in the king's court, or by a customary devise, which, when recorded
in the local court, operated like a fine. Again, certain obligations, by
the tenor of which the obligor expressly bound himself to the obligee
and his assigns, could be enforced by a transferee. If, for instance,
one granted an annuity to A. and his assigns, or covenanted to enfeoff
A. and his assigns, or made a charter of warranty to A. and his assigns,
the assignee was allowed to bring an. action in his own name against
the grantor, covenantor, and warrantor, respectively.
"The significance of this exception lies in the fact that it goes far
to explain the reason of the rule which prohibits the assignment of
rights of action in general. The traditional opinion that this rule
had its origin in the aversion of the 'sages and founders of our law'
to the 'multiplying of contentions and suits' shows the power of a
great name for the perpetuation of error. The inadequacy of this
explanation by Lord Coke was first pointed out by Mr. Spence. The
rule is not only older than the doctrine of maintenance in English
law, but is believed to be a principle of universal law.
"A right of action in one person implies a corresponding duty in
another to perform an agreement or to make reparation for a tort.
That is to say, a chose in action always presupposes a personal relation between two individuals. But a personal relation in the very
nature of things cannot be assigned. Even a relation between a person
and a physical thing in his possession, as already stated, cannot be
transferred. The thing itself may be transferred, and, by consent of
the parties to such transfer, the relation between the transferror and
the thing may be destroyed and replaced by a new but similar relation between the transferee and the res. But where one has a mere
right against another, there is nothing that is capable of transfer.
The duty of B. to A., whether arising ex contractu or ex delito, may,
of course, be extinguished and replaced by a new and coextensive
duty of B. to C. But this substitution of duties can be accomplished
only in two ways: either by the consent of B., or, without his consent, by an act of sovereignty. The exceptions already mentioned of
assignments by or to the king, and conveyances of remainders and
reversions in the King's Court, are illustrations of the exercise of
sovereign power. Further illustrations are found in the bankruptcy
laws which enable the assignee to realize the bankrupt's choses in
action, and in the Statute 4 and 5 Anne, c. 16, which abolished the
necessity of attornment.
"When the substitution of duties is by consent, the consent may
be given either after the duty arises or contemporaneously with its
creation. In the former case the substitution is known as a novation,
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unless the duty relates to land in the possession of a tenant, in which
case it is called an attornment. A consent contemporaneous with the
creation of the duty is given whenever an obligation is by its terms
made to run in favor of the obligee and his assigns, as in the case of
annuities, covenants, and warranties before mentioned, or to order
or bearer, as in the case of bills and notes and other negotiable
securities. Here, too, on the occasion of each successive transfer, there
is a novation by virtue of the obligor's consent given in advance;
the duty to the transferror is extinguished and a new duty is created
in favor of the transferee."

The rule against inalienability of choses was not accepted
with grace by the commercial interests, nor did the protection which the transferee received in equity seem to meet the
commercial requirements. As a result the common law
lawyers devised the so-called letter of attorney which they
hoped would meet the necessities of the commercial classes.'
By such a letter the owner of a claim appointed the intended
transferee as his attorney, with power to enforce the claim
in the appointor's name, but to retain whatever he might
recover for his own benefit. This devise (assignment with
letter of attorney) 4 for avoiding the rule against inalienability of choses was not altogether satisfactory to the transferees. For instance, the security given by the warrant of
attorney might be lost in one of the following ways: 1. the
assignor might revoke the power of attorney expressly, or,
revocation might be effectuated by implication of law, as by
3 "In 1 Lilly's Abr. 125, it is said: 'A statute merchant or staple, or bond,
etc., cannot be assigned over to another so as to vest an interest whereby the
assignee may sue in his own name but they are every day transferred by letter
of attorney, etc...... These letters of attorney for the attorney's own use,
whether borrowed from the similar procuratio in rem suam of the Roman law
or not, are of great antiquity .... Know ye that I do assign and attorn in
my stead E., my dear partner, to demand and receive the same rent of forty
shillings with the arrears and by distress the same to levy in my name ... and
all things to do as to the same matter FOR HER OWN PROFIT as well as
ever I myself could have done in my own proper person.'" Amsxs, Lcr~uaEs ON
LEGAL HISTORY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 213.
4

"Formerly an express power of attorney was indispensable . . . the notion

of an implied power being as much beyond the conception of lawyers three
centuries ago as the analogous idea of an implied promise... Today, of course,
the power will be implied from circumstantial evidence. Formerly a deed could
not be delivered in escrow without express words to that effect." Am, LECTuREs ON LEGAL HISTORY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 214 note.
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death; 2. or if the assignee still remains the owner of the
claim, his bankruptcy by virtue of the bankruptcy statute
might be expected to give title to his assignee in bankruptcy
to the exclusion of an assignee claiming under a prior assignment if that is interpreted as giving a mere power of
attorney, and an attachment by garnishment of the debt by
a creditor of the assignor might be expected to prevail over
a prior assignment; 3. the assignor might, by other assignment, appoint other persons with authority to collect the
claim, and either they or the assignor himself might collect
the claim in fraud of the original assignee. These difficulties were partly met by the jurisdiction which equity assumed over assignment at an early date."
The effectiveness of the power of attorney was greatly
increased by equity's aid in their enforcement:
"Courts of Equity undertook as a branch of their jurisdiction to
give, so far as possible, the effect to an assignment which the parties
intended. As will be seen equity did not go so far as to treat the
assignee as a true successor, like an assignee in bankruptcy, but it
was found possible in effect to enforce specifically a covenant on the
part of the assignor not to revoke the power given to the assignee,
and indeed without the aid of a covenant against revocation or of any
power of attorney other than that necessarily implied from the assignment itself, to hold that the assignee had an irrevocable right,
commensurate with that which the parties contemplated, in any controversy between the parties themselves or with those in similar position. Accordingly, Courts of Equity held that an assignee for value
would be protected against any person except one who had in good
faith and for value reduced to possession the chose in action. Therefore, equity preferred the assignee of a chose in action. over a creditor
of the assignor who subsequently garnished the debtor as a means of
collecting his claim against the assignor. Equity also held that the
assignee would be protected in his right as against an assignee in a
subsequent bankruptcy of the assignor; and at the end of the eighteenth
century the same decision was made by a court of law, which held
that it would take notice of the doctrines of equity in regard to assignments and apply them. At the present time so fully have courts of
law adopted the principle that assignment of choses in action will be
protected, that where an absolute and total assignment of a chose in
5
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action is made, application to a court of chancery is not often necessary; and where the assignee has an adequate remedy at law, equity
will not take jurisdiction to enforce his rights. The power given to an
assignee to collect and keep the proceeds of the claim assigned, being
wholly for the interest of the assignee may be delegated by him to
another, and a sub-assignment is protected as fully as the original
assignment." 6

Although there were the enumerated defects in the assignment with power of attorney, the arrangement did meet
a serious commercial need and was widely adopted by the
commercial interest of its use. Dean Ames writes:
"Indeed, so effectual was the power of attorney as a transfer, that,
during a considerable interval, it was thought unduly to stimulate
litigation, and therefore to fall within the statutory prohibition of
maintenance, unless the power was executed for the benefit of a creditor of the transferor. Powers executed for the benefit of a purchaser
or donee were treated as void from the beginning of the fifteenth
century if not earlier, till near the close of the seventeenth century." 7

We have noted that as time wore on an expressed power
of attorney was no longer indispensable and that by force
of the assignment the assignee by implication acquired the
right to enforce the chose by suit brought in the name of
the assignor. Yet the assignee still proceeded, in a sense,
as the agent of the assignor. The rights of the assignee
are determined by the rules of equity which were worked
out at a time before the common law would take notice of
the assignee's rights.'
It is true that the procedure compelling the assignee to
bring suit in the name of the assignor was sometimes questioned, as for instance, in Master v. Miller,' Buller, J., says:
"But still it must be admitted, that tho the courts of law have gone
the length of taking notice of assignments of choses in actions and of
acting upon them, yet in many cases they have adhered to the formal
objections, that the action shall be brought in the name of the assignor,
8
7
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A s, LEcTuREs 0N LEGAL HisTORY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 213.

8 Winch v. Keeley, 1 T. R. 619 (1787). In this case the assignee brought
suit in the name of the assignor and therefore the question whether a chose in
action might be so assigned as to give legal title to the assignee was not involved.
9 4 T. P. 320 (1791).
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and not in the name of the assignee. I see no use or convenience in
preserving that shadow when the substance is gone; and that it is
merely a shadow, is apparent from the later cases, in which the courts
have taken care that it shall never work injustice."

Yet the practice continued until prohibited by statutory
enactment of the so-called real party in interest rule." °
Even under the statutes, permitting the assignee to sue
the obligor in his own name, the assignee still proceeds in
a real sense as a representative of the assignor. This is
true because the statutes only introduced a change in procedure. In Leach v. Greene" the court held that a suit
could not be maintained in the name of the assignee where
the plaintiff, who had purchased a cause of action in New
York, where the real party in interest statute was in effect, brought suit in his own name on the assigned cause of
action in Massachusetts where the rule was that the assignee must bring his suit in the name of the assignor. It
thus seems that the statute permitting a suit in the name
of the real party in interest did not affect a change in the
title to the assigned chose in action.
10 In 1848, New York enacted a statute which provided that: "Every action
must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." England followed
by the passage of THE JUDICATURE AcT (1873) § 25 (6). STAT. 36 & 37 Vlr.,
c. 66: "Any absolute assignment, by writing under the hand of the assignor
(not purporting to be by way of charge only), of any debt or other legal
chose in action, of which express notice in writing shall have been given to the
debtor, trustee, or other person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to receive or claim such debt or chose in action, shall be, and be deemed
to have been effectual in law (subject to all equities which would have been
entitled to priority over the right of the assignee if the Act had not passed),
to pass and transfer the legal right to such debt or chose in action from the
date of such notice,\\and all legal and other remedies for the same, and the
power to give a good discharge for the same, without the concurrence of the
assignor: Provided always, that if the debtor, trustee, or other person liable
in respect of such debt or chose in action shall have had notice that such
assignment is disputed by the assignor or any one claiming under him, or of
any other opposing or conflicting claims to such debt or chose in action, he
shall be entitled, if he think fit, to call upon the several persons making claim
thereto to interplead concerning the same, or he may, if he think fit, pay the
same into the High Court under and in conformity with the provisions of the
Acts for the relief of trustees." At the present time practically everywhere
the assignee sues in his own name,
11 116 Mass. 534 (1875).
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For purpose of illustration, if we concede that overdue
paper is a chose in action, it would seem that if A, owner
of overdue paper, should sell the same to B, B would not
get the legal title and his position would be an agent of A
,with power of attorney to collect the chose. B's rights
being measured by what A's rights would have been if A
had not sold the paper.
The rule pertaining to the purchase of chattels in so far
as we are concerned can be briefly stated as follows:
"A court of equity will not deprive a defendant of any right of
property, whether legal or equitable, for which he has given value

without notice of the plaintiff's equity." 12
The reason for this rule as stated by Dean Ames is:
"The rule just given is simply an application of that comprehensive
principle which lies at the foundation of constructive trusts and other

equitable obligations created by operation of law (including implied

or qwzsi contracts, which are really equitable liabilities, upon which the
common law assumes to give a remedy), namely, that a court of
equity will compel the surrender of an advantage by a defendant
whenever, but only whenever, upon grounds of obvious justice, it is

unconscientious for him to retain it at another's expense. Indeed, it
is not too much to say that the purchaser of a title from one who
holds it subject to an equity is always charged,if chargeable at all,

as a constructive trustee. If he acquired the title with notice of
another's equity his acquisition was dishonest, and he must, of course,
surrender it. If he gave no value, though his acquisition was honest,
his retention of the title, after knowledge of the equity, is plainly dis-

honest. If he gave value, and had no notice of the equity, it is eminently just for him to keep what he has got." 13
Assuming for the purpose of illustration that under the
above rule overdue paper is a chattel, if A, the owner of
overdue paper, sells the same to B, an innocent purchaser,
B gets the legal title, and the outstanding equities which
were enforceable during A's ownership are lost.
The transferee of negotiable paper brings suit thereon
in his own name. If the instrument sued on is a bill, the
12

Amxs,

13
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right extends back to the time when foreign bills were first
recognized by the common law of England at the beginning of the seventeenth century. As to promissory notes,
the right dates back at least to the Statute of Anne. 4
Was the right of a transferee of negotiable paper to
bring suit on the paper in his own name a real exception
to the common law rule against alienating choses in action?
In Dean Ames' explanation for the rule against alienating
choses, he suggests that if the instrument according to its
original tender was payable to the obligee and his assigns,
as in the case of annuities, covenants, and warranties, or
to order or to bearer, as in the case of bills and notes, the
relation created would not be personal since the obligor
would be consenting in advance to a novation. However,
the rule presumed to exist from the cases of annuities,
covenants, and warranties does not seem to be as broad
as Dean Ames' discussion would lead one to think. One
might believe that whenever the obligor's promise ran in
favor of the obligee or his assigns the relation created was
not personal and a transferee might have brought suit in
his own name. But this was not true as illustrated in the
case of Skinner v. Somes. 5 Here suit was brought on a
bond which was made by the defendant to one John Somes,
his heirs, executors, administrators or assigns. The plaintiff, transferee of the obligee, brought suit upon the bond
in his own name. The court in sustaining a demurrer to
the declaration said:
"This is the first attempt to maintain an action of debt by the assignee of a bond in his own name. The word assigns has been for centuries inserted in bonds and obligations, but no one has conceived
that it gave to them a negotiable property, so as to transfer the right
of action upon them to the assignee."

In Jessel v. The Williamsburgh Insurance Company 1 the
obligee of an insurance policy, with the consent of the
14
15

16

3 & 4 ANNE, C. 9-(1704).
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3 Hill (N. Y.) 88 (1842).
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Insurance Company, assigned the policy. The assignee
brought suit on the policy in his own name. The court
nonsuited the plaintiff saying:
"We know of no principle upon which the assignee of a policy of
insurance can be allowed to sue upon it in his own name. The general
rule applicable to personal contracts is, that, if assigned, the action
for a breach must be brought in the name of the assignor, except
where the defendant has expressly promised the assignee to respond
to him.... The argument that the policy in question originally con-

templated an assignment, would be equally cogent in all cases, for
aught we see, of a promise in form to one and his assigns; and yet it

is settled that the latter words do not impart a negotiable quality to
the promise so as to enable the assignee to sue upon it in his own

name."
It therefore seems that the right of the transferee of
negotiable paper to sue thereon in his own name is not due
to the fact that the common law did not regard the relation between obligor and obligee as personal when the
promise ran in favor of the obligee and his assigns, or to
the obligee or order, or bearer, but that the transferee's
right to maintain suit in his own name on negotiable paper,
that is, in cases where the promise ran to the obligee, or
to his order, or to bearer, was as stated by Mr. Chitty, a peculiar privilege accorded these instruments by our courts
of justice in aid of commerce. If the instrument was negotiable, then ipso facto the transferee by operation of law
might sue in his own name.
The basis for the right of the transferee of negotiable
paper to sue in his own name is very important. If the
basis of the right is the tenor of the promise, it is conceivable that an obligation of a promisor to an obligee and his
assigns would become absolute, if, as suggested by Dean
Ames, such transaction amounts to a novation. This would
be true at least when the instrument is in the hands of the
transferee. The dealings between the parties would be
similar to the following case:
A holds a claim against B. B promises C that if he, C,
will purchase the claim from A, he will pay C the amount
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of the claim. In reliance upon A's promise, C purchases
the claim. B will have to pay C even though it should
later develop that A could not have enforced the claim
against B. It would seem to make no difference whether B's promise was made to C when the contract with
A was executed or when C purchased.
On the other hand, if overdue commercial paper is a
chose in action and the peculiar characteristics of commercial paper are based entirely on the privilege extended this
paper ipso jure and the law extends the privilege to meet
commercial requirements, then it would seem that the privilege extended should be commensurate with commercial requirements and no more.
With this survey of principles sketched, the problems involved in classifying overdue commercial paper as choses
in actions or chattels will be noted. Both choses in action
and chattels are property. Property implies the exclusive
right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing, "when
used subjunctively, it means that with respect to which this
right exists, or that which is one's own." " According to
Dean Ames, "a true property may, therefore, be shortly
defined as possession coupled with the unlimited right of
possession." 11
Personal chattels are properly things movable, which may
be carried about by the owner: such as animals, household
stuff, money, jewels, corn, garments and everything else
which can be put in motion and transferred from one place
to another. 9
A chose in action is a right not reduced into possession.
It may be an interest in a contract, which, in case of nonperformance, can only be reduced into beneficial possession
by an action or suit.2" In the words of Mr. Justice McVann v. Edwards, 135 N. C. 661, 67 L. R. A. 461 (1904).
18 A Es, LEc'URas 01 LEGAL HISTORY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 193.
19 2 KENT COM1-IENTARIES (14th ed.) 340.
20 2 BLACxSTONE COMMENTARIES 442.
17

PAST DUE COMMERCIAL PAPER

Reynolds, "The difference between the two things seems
obvious enough." 21
As to the different modes of acquiring original ownership
of tangible personalty and of intangibles: Inception of title
(unlimited right to possession) to tangible personalty accrues by original acquisition."
Title to intangibles, where

the inception of the right was not a breach of duty imposed
by law, depends upon the existence of contractural facts.
As to the original inception of the rights, there would
seem to be little similarity between rights in tangibles and
contractual rights. To tangibles, the right depends upon

original acquisition.

In contracts the right depends upon

the existence of contractual facts. The inception of rights
on commercial paper clearly corresponds to the inception

of contractual rights on non-commercial paper.

On com-

mercial paper, however, the promisor may incur a legal liability even though contractual facts did not exist at the

time the instrument was issued if the holder

23

is a holder

in due course. 'Considered from the view of inception of
rights, commercial paper should be classified with choses
in action rather than with tangibles. This would be true
if subsequent motives of dealing with rights to tangibles and
rights against an obligor on commercial paper would not

justify a different classification.
Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minn., 230 U. S. 204, 74 L. Ed. 371 (1929).
Original acquisition is acquired by occupancy; by accession; by intellectual labor.
23 Section 191 of the N. I. L. states that: " 'Holder' means the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof."
Section 52 of the N. I. L. states that: "A holder in due course is a holder
who has taken the instrument under the following conditions:
1. That it is complete and regular upon its face;
2. That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without
notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact;
3. That he took it in good faith and for value;
4. That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it."
21

22
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Rights to property (ownership) may be transferred by act
24
of law.
At common law the rule against transfering causes of
action did not apply when the crown was a party, and a
debt might have come to the Queen by attainder.2 5 If the
felon were the owner of commercial paper, rights thereon
would also be forfeited.
As to transfer by succession, that is, the mode by which
one set of persons, members of a corporation aggregate, acquire the rights of another set which preceded them, presents no special problem.
Upon marriage, ownership of personal property, tangibles,
belonging to the wife vested in the husband. As to choses
in action, the rule was different, the husband having the
right and power during coverture to receive and reduce to
his possession all choses in action belonging to the wife at
the time of marriage, or which accrued to her while the coverture continued.26 The absolute ownership vesting in the
husband only when the chose was reduced to possession."
This rule applied to commercial paper.2 8
A judgment lien in the absence of a statute does not attach to personal property.2 9 Generally speaking, however,
any species of personal property properly described as a
chattel is subject to execution and consequently an execution lien.8" Choses in action are subject to execution only
when made so by statute, or are voluntarily given up to be
sold on execution. 1 In many jurisdictions, statutes have
been enacted by which the chose in action of the debtor
may be reached by process of garnishment, and in some
24 By forfeiture; succession; marriage; judgment; insolvency; intestacy.
25 Allen's Case, Owen, 113, 74 K. B. 939 (1584).
26 Standeford v. Devol, 21 Ind. 404 (1863).
27 Supra note 26.
28 Rogers v. Bank of Pike County, 69 Mo. 560 (1879).
29 Ball v. Barnett, 39 Ind. 53 (1872).
50
Sumter County v. Hanes, Jones & Cadbury Co., 143 Ga. 124, 84 S. E.
425 (1915).
31 The Marion Township Union Draining Co. v. Norris, 37 Ind. 424 (1871).
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jurisdictions, under certain conditions by expressed statutory authority, all choses in action of the debtor may be
levied upon and sold under execution against him in the
same manner as other personal property. 32 Personal property subject to execution is subject to attachment. But it
is said that as a general rule an instrument evidencing a
debt and providing for the payment of money, such as, promissory notes and bonds, are attachable." The problems
involved in subjecting rights on negotiable paper to the
claims of the creditors of the holder are well summarized
by Professor Campbell. 4
In the case of tangibles, the creditors of the owner can,
with the aid of the law, transfer the res under such circumstances that the debtors' rights thereto are completely extinguished. In cases of choses in action, including commercial paper, the obligee's rights to performance on the
part of the obligor are extinguished. At the present time,
there would seem to be little difference between subjecting
the rights constituting ownership of chattels and rights constituting ownership of choses to a creditor's claim. Of
course, there is a difference in procedure made necessary by
the obvious difference between rights in rem and rights in
personam. In either case the creditor can, with aid of the
law, extinguish the debtors' rights and create coextensive
rights in himself.
Bay v. Saulspaugh, 74 Ind. 397 (1881).
Attachment, 6 C. J., Sec. 353.
34 "Under appropriate statutes, a creditor may reach a negotiable instrument
as an asset of his debtor in either of two ways: (1) By attachment and sale
of the instrument itself, in which case the only problem is whether the statute
is broad enough to include this type of property (41 A. L. R. 1003); or (2) By
garnishment of the maker or acceptor, and collection from him of the amount
due, a process sometimes referred to as attachment, as in Kieffer v. Ehler,
18 Pa. 388 (1852).
"The process of garnishment is subject to two fundamental requirements.
In the first place, it must affirmatively appear that the garnishee is indebted to
the plaintiff's debtor, the defendant in the principal action...
"In the second place, a garnishee must never be placed in a worse position
by the process; judgment must not be rendered against one liable on an instrument unless payment of the judgment will be a defense to any subsequent
action on the instrument." CAMPBELL'S CAsES ON BiL.s AmD NoTEs (1928) 531.
32

33
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In case of transfer by insolvency, the rights of the insolvent, whether rights to a res or rights in personam, pass to
the representative of the insolvent. This was true at a
time when the common law generally did not permit assigning choses in action.3
As to transfers by intestacy: Upon death of the owner of
the right, the right passes to the representative of the deceased, whether the right be in rem or in personam.
Summarizing:
Rights constituting ownership may be
transferred by operation of law. The law makes no difference whether the rights are in rem or in personam except
under the common law in cases of transfer by marriage.
Rights to property (ownership) may be transferred by
the acts of the party. 6
The owner of a chattel, that is, the person in possession
and having unlimited right to possession, may generally do
with the chattel as he pleases. He may give the chattel
to another, the donee acquiring the rights to the chattel coextensive with the rights of the donor; he may sell the chattel, the vendee acquiring rights coextensive with the rights
of the vendor; or by contract he may create an interest short
of unlimited ownership in another, as in a bailment.
Generally, excepting transfers by act of law, the rights of
the owner cannot be divested without the owner's consent.
The principal exception to this exists in cases where the
owner acts in such a way as to be estopped from asserting
his rights against a bona fide purchaser. The results of a
transfer by act of the party has been analyzed by Dean
Ames as follows:
"The title in such cases is said to pass by transfer. For all practical
purposes this is a just expression. But if the transaction be closely
scrutinized, the physical res is the only thing transferred. The seller's
right of possession, being a relation between himself and the res, is
purely personal to him, and cannot, in the nature of things, .betransThat is by gift, by contract, or by sale.
36 Fawcett, Isham & Co. v. Osborn, Adams & Co., 32 Ill.
411 (1863).
35
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ferred to another. The purchaser may and does acquire a similar and
coextensive right of possession, but not the same right that the seller
had. What really takes place is this: the seller transfers the res and
abandons or extinguishes his right of possession. The buyer's possession is thus unqualified by the existence of any right of possession in
another, and he, like the occupant, and for the same reason, becomes
absolute owner." 37
This incident of ownership, the right to transfer, has al-

ways been favored in the common law. Attempts to limit
the right have always been frowned upon as is evidenced by
the English hostility to spendthrift trusts, the rule against
perpetuities, and accumulations.
As to the transfer of rights to tangible personalty-by acts
of the party the following maxim applies: "Where there is
equal equity, the law must prevail."-- 8 The application of
the rule not only takes into consideration equal equities
but maintains the right in a transferable thing.
Transfers of choses in action by acts of party:
The common law as to transfers of choses in action by
acts of the party has been previously stated. We noted
that at common law choses were not transferable by act of
the party, the right being regarded as one entirely personal
to the obligee. The right of i transferee was, however,
protected in equity. The extent of the right acquired by
the transferee in equity was determined by the maxim:
"Where there are equal equities, the first in order of time
shall prevail." " When the transferee proceeded under warrant of attorney, suit was brought in the name of the
obligee and any defenses of the obligor to the enforcement
Ais, 'LEcTusas ON LEGAL HISTORY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 194.
38 The meaning of the maxim is: "If two parties have equal equitable
37

claims upon or interest in the same subject-matter, or in other words if each is
equally entitled to protection and aid of a court of equity with respect of his
equitable interest, and one of them, in addition to his equity, also obtains the
legal title to the subject-matter, then he who thus has the legal title will prevail."
PONMROY's EQunry JURISPRUDENCE (1918) 678.
89 Pomeroy explains the maxim as follows: "As between persons having
only equitable interest, if their interests are in all other respects equal, priority
in time gives the best equity, or qui prior est tempore, potior est jure.'
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of the chose were admissible. Under the real party in interest statutes, the assignee brings suit on the chose in
his own name. However, strange as it may seem, his title
is still equitable and his rights determined by equitable
rules worked out at a time when the common law regarded
the right as purely personal. At the present time, it would
seem that a contract right in personam which is subject to
no inceptional defects can no longer be regarded as personal
and that therefore it should be transferred according to
the same rules as a right to a chattel. It is now time for us to
forget our squeamishness concerning ability to pass the
legal title to an assignee and to apply the maxim, "Where
there is equal equity, the law must prevail," in cases where
a right can be effectively assigned.
The preceding proposition cannot claim either newness
or novelty. Ames writes:
"It seems to have been a common opinion in early times that a court

of equity would give no assistance against a purchaser for value

without notice." 40

Chancelor Kent was of the opinion that a purchaser for
value without notice of a chose in action did not take subject to latent equities, that is, equities of persons other
than the debtor party.4 ' The Reporter of the Restatement
of the Law of Contracts, Professor Williston, after noticing
conflicts of authorities, states the desirable rule to be as
follows:
"If an assignor's right against the obligor is voidable by some one
other than the obligor or is held in trust for such a person, an assignee

who purchases the assignment for value in good faith neither knowing
nor having reason to know of the right of such person cannot be deprived of the assigned right or its proceeds." 42
Pomeroy fears this doctrine of latent equities on the
ground that it might render all choses of action negotiable
40

41
42

LEc'ruREs ON LEGAL HISTORY, op. cit. supra note
Murray v. Llyburn, 2 Johns. Ch. Rep. 454.
RESTATEXENT F THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 174.

AMES,

2,

at 253.
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and thus affect the original debtor.4" The doctrine does not
seem to lead to any such result. Property consists of rights,
whether in rem or in personam. As the owner of a right
in rem can generally transfer no better right than he has,
unless application can be made of the maxim: "Where there
are equal equities, the law must prevail," so the owner of a
right in personam can transfer no better right than he possessed unless the same maxim applies.
The vendee of a chattel must ascertain whether or not
the person proposing to sell has title.44 So the purchaser
of a chose in action must ascertain whether or not the inception of the right against the debtor was complete. There
would seem to be no more reason for considering that mere
possession conferred title in the one case than in the other.
In cases of choses in action, if the debtor has a defense it
would seem that no property right ever had any existence,
and transferring title to the right would therefore be impossible. Mr. Pomeroy seems to be of the opinion that once
the assignee of a chose can acquire legal title then the extraordinary rule of negotiable instruments must be applied,
rather than the common rules of property, a conclusion
seemingly not justified. As to justness in results, there
would seem to be little difference between the position of one
who has equitable rights in a chattel losing those rights by
sale of the chattel to a bona fide purchaser and the position of one who has equitable interest in a chose losing those
interests by the sale of the chose to a bona fide purchaser.
In both cases the owner of the equitable right must stand the
loss as his contribution to commercial convenience.
PomEERoy's EQUITy JURISPRUDENCE (1918) § 711.
44 Ballard v. Burgett, 40 N. Y. 314 (1869): "Simply intrusting the possession of a chattel to another as depository, pledgee, or other bailee, or even under
a conditional executory contract of sale, is dearly insufficient to preclude the
real owner from reclaiming the property in case of unauthorized disposition of
it by the person so intrusted. The mere possession of chattels, by whatever
means acquired, if there be no other evidence of property or authority to sell
from the true owner, will not enable the possessor to give a good title."
43

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

Transfers of overdue negotiable paper by act of parties:
From an early date, as previously noted, the common law
courts extended to contracts in negotiable form certain peculiar privileges in order to meet the necessities of commerce.
These privileges were:
(1.) The fact that the transferee obtained the legal title
and could sue at law in his on name, and
(2.)
The fact that the transferee in good faith and for
value took free from all equities and nearly all defenses
subsisting in favor of prior parties to, the paper, or equities
subsisting in favor of parties who never were parties to
the paper.
The difference between equities and defenses should be
observed. The equities referred to are the ordinary rights,
of which the owner receives protection only in equity. The
equity in the contract would be comparable to an equitable
interest in a chattel, ownership of which might be lost by
application of the maxim: "Where there is equal equity, the
law must prevail." The subject of defenses requires more
consideration. The historical origin is given by Ames,4 5
who first points out that the obligee who lost the specialty
had no remedy at law but had to resort to equity, also shows
that the obligor was just as helpless at law when sued by the
obligee on the specialty. Thus the obligee would be entitled to judgment at law even though the specialty was
secured by fraud; given in an illegal transaction; given for
a consideration which had failed; paid; paid by accord and
satisfaction; or executed for accommodation of the obligee
plaintiff. In all of these cases the obligor was compelled
to resort to equity where an injunction would issue against
the obligee forbidding suit on the specialty at law; hence
we have the term equitable defenses. The relation between specialty contracts and equitable defenses, and defenses to negotiable contracts is made clear by Ames:
45

AimS, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY, op.
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note 2, at 104.
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"By statute or judicial innovation, as we have seen, the jurisdiction
of the common laws courts has been greatly extended, except in the
Federal courts of this country, in the matter of defenses to actions
on formal contracts. In all cases where, formerly, a defendant was
obliged to apply to equity for relief against an unconscionable plaintiff, he may now defeat his adversary at law. But the change of forum
does not mean any change in the essential character of the relief. The
common law accomplishes, by peremptorily barring the action, the
same result, and upon the same grounds, that the Chancellor effected
by a permanent unconditional injunction. It is as true to-day as it
ever was, that fraud, payment, and the like do not nullify the title of
the fraudulent or paid obligee, but are simply conclusive reasons why
he ought not to enforce his title.
"The truly equitable or personal character of these defenses at
law has commonly only a theoretical value in actions upon the ancient
common law specialty, the instrument under seal. But it is of the
highest practical importance in actions upon the modem mercantile
specialty, the bill of exchange or promissory note. For the legal
title to bills and notes, by reason of their negotiability, passes freely
from hand to hand, and equity would not restrain, by injunction, any
holder from enforcing his title, if he came by it honestly abd for
value. And the plea at law being, in substance, like the bill in equity
for an injunction, we see at once the reason for the familiar rule that
fraud and other defenses, based upon the conduct of the payee or
some other particular person, cannot be successfully pleaded against
46
any bona fide holder for value."

The history of defenses has sometimes led to a classification of equities to negotiable paper as equities of ownership and equitable defenses instead of merely equities and
defenses. 7
It must be noted that before the transfer of negotiable
paper will cut off equities, the transferee must, according to general equitable doctrines, be a purchaser in good
faith and for value. It thus appears that the common law
courts, to meet commercial requirements, made the first
concessions in favor of negotiable paper, conceding that the
legal title could be transferred. It being conceded that
the legal title to a right in personam could be transferred,
the same as a legal title to a right in rem, equity could ap46
47

AimEs, LEcruRES ON LEGAL HISTORY, op. cit, supra note 2, at 114.

See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Rights in Overdue Paper, 31 HAR. L. REv. 1104.
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ply the maxim: "Where there is equal equity, the law must
prevail." Hence we see the application of the doctrine of
bona fide purchaser to negotiable paper. But in order to
apply this doctrine, the purchaser must have no notice of
equities or defenses, which may either be actual notice, that
is, actual knowledge of the equity or defenses, or knowledge
made by law which is imputed to him. The latter is constructive notice. In Brown v. Davies " the payee received
payment of the note without delivering it to the maker and
after maturity sold the note to the plaintiff. The question
arose as to whether or not the evidence by which the
maker, defendant, offered to prove payment to the payee
was admissable. The trial court held that the evidence
was not admissible on the ground that it was irrelevant unless it could be shown that plaintiff had actual knowledge of
the payment. On appeal a new trial was granted. Ashhurst, J., said,
"That where a note is overdue, that alone is such a suspicious circumstance as makes it incumbent on the party receiving it to satisfy
himself that it is a good one, otherwise much mischief might arise."

From the date of Brown v. Davies to the present it has been
held in the United States 4 9 and in England that non-payment at maturity is constructive notice of equitable defenses
in many cases and in others it is notice of equities of ownership.
In Hinckley v. Union Pacific Railroad 5o the court said:
"It is an elementary principle of commercial law that negotiable paper
overdue carries with it, on its very face, notice of defective title sufficient to put the transferee on inquiry ....

After maturity, a coupon,

like any other negotiable security, loses the protection of the law merchant, and becomes a mere chose in action."
3 T. R. 80, 100 Eng. Rep. 466 (1789).
Section 52 N. I. L. states: "A holder in due course is a holder who has
taken the instrument under the following conditions:
1. ...
2. That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without
notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact."
50 129 Mass. 52 (1880).
48

49
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In British & American Mortg. Co. v. Smith
made the following statement:

1

the court

"The only question, therefore, which we are called upon to decide,
is whether the assignee of a note and mortgage transferred after
maturity can claim the protection of the equity rule in favor of purchasers for valuable consideration, without notice."

The conclusion was that the transferee after maturity could
not claim protection of a bona fide purchaser. In Bradley
v. Linn,52 Conger, J., was of the opinion that
"A person taking a note after its maturity receives it subject to all
equities existing between former parties to the instrument, whether
they are, or not, apparent on the note. It is dishonored by not being
taken up at its maturity. It comes to him tainted with suspicion and
he is put upon inquiry as to the rights of the former holders, and the
real and not the apparent liability of the makers. He takes it precisely
as it was held by those from whom he acquires his title. The maxim
caveat emptor applies in such a case."

The statement by the Massachusetts court, in Hinckley
v. Union PacificRailroad,that an overdue negotiable security loses the protection of the law merchant, and becomes a
mere chose in action, squarely presents the problem as to
the extent of the right acquired by the transferees of negotiable paper negotiated after maturity. It is submitted
that the statement of the court is too broad, there being
important differences between overdue commercial paper
and a mere chose in action. Overdue commercial paper is
still negotiable.58 An overdue promissory note is negotiable
within a statute exempting from attachment, debts secured
by bills of exchange on negotiable promissory notes; hence
the amount due thereon is exempt from garnishment. 4 A
45 S. C. 83, 22 S. E. 747 (1895).
19 Ill. App. 322 (1885).
53 Section 47 N. I. L. provides: "An instrument negotiable in its origin
continues to be negotiable until it has been restrictively indorsed or discharged
by payment or otherwise."
54 Oakdale Mfg. Co. v. Clarke, 29 R. I. 192, 69 At. 681 (1908).
51
52
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purchaser after maturity may sue in his own name. 5 A
holder " who becomes such after maturity acquires the legal
title and does not, like an assignee sue as agent of the assignor. In Davis v. Miller " the payee after maturity transferred the note to the plaintiff. The defendant, maker of
the note, without notice of the transfer, paid the amount
due on the note to the payee. The defendant stated as
his defense that payment had been made before notice of
transfer. In the course of the opinion, the court said:
"There is a material distinction in regard to notice, between a negotiable note, and choses in action not negotiable. Choses in action
not negotiable are not designed for circulation. They may ,be assigned
in equity, but not so as to -prejudice the debtor who, until he receives
notice of the assignment, may safely make payment to the original
creditor."

The court gave judgment to the plaintiff. Valuable consideration was not considered necessary to a valid transfer
of a negotiable instrument which may be the subject of a
gift either inter vivos or mortis causa. In Milnes v. Dawson " it was held that payment by the acceptor to the drawer
of a bill of exchange, after the latter had indorsed it without
value to the indorsee was not a good defense to an action
by the indorsee against the acceptor of the bill. Parke,
B., said:
"It would be altogether inconsistent with the negotiability of these
instruments, to hold, that after the indorser has transferred the property in the instrument, he may, by receiving the amount of it, affect
the right of his indorsee."

In Davis v. Miller the judge could see no distinction between gifts made after maturity and those made before. In
55 Section 51 of the N. I. L. provides: "The holder of a negotiable instrument may sue thereon in his own name; and payment to him in due course
discharges the instrument."
Also, Ohio Valley Bankirfg & Trust Co. v. Great South. F. Ins. Co., 176
Ky. 694, 197 S. W. 399 (1917).
56 "Holder" means the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in
possession of it, or the bearer thereof. N. I. L., § 191.
57 14 Gratt (Va.) 1 (1857).
58 5 Ex. 948, 155 Eng. Rep. 413.
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view of the fact that the donor could not revoke the gift
in either case, there probably would be none. 9 The holder's
right on the instrument may be lost by renunciation. 0 In
this respect the rights on the instrument would closely resemble the rights on a chattel which may be lost by abandonment. Trover may be maintained for a negotiable instrument after it is due. 1 Overdue negotiable instruments
are considered as goods and chattels within the Statute of
Frauds, although choses in action are not generally within
the Statute.2 From this brief review of some of the attributes of overdue paper it would seem that there are
many circumstances in which past due paper is treated much
as a chattel and that the statement of the Massachusetts'
court in holding it to be a chose in action cannot be supported in all cases.
The holdings in a few of the cases where the indorsee acquired the instrument after maturity will be noted. First
with reference to those decided before the Negotiable Instrument Act:
59

TBsa

The cases in which gratuitous assignments are revocable are set out in

RrSTATEMxwT OF THE LAW OF CONTRA Ts,

§ 158, as follows:

"(1) The right acquired by the assignee under a gratuitous assignment
is revocable by the assignor's death, by a subsequent assignment by the assignor, or by notice from the assignor received by the assignee or by obligor,
unless,
(a) the assignment is in a writing either under seal or of such a
nature as to be capable of transferring title to a chattel without
delivery thereof and without consideration; or
(b) tfie assigned right is evidenced by a tangible token or writing, the
surrender of which is required by the obligor's contract for its
enforcement and this token or writing is delivered to the assignee; or
(c) the assignor should reasonably expect the assignment to induce
action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the
part of the assignee and such action or forbearance is induced.
(2) If an assignee holding an assignment revocable because gratuitous
obtains before revocation,
(a) payment or satisfaction of the obligation, or
(b) judgment against the obligor, or
(c) a new contract of the obligor by novation.
He can hold what he has thus acquired. Whatever he obtains after
revocation can be recovered from him by the assignor."
00 N. I. L. § 122.
61
ller v. Race, 1 Burr. 452, 2 Keny. 189, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (1758).
62 WIr=T"oN ON SAirs (1924) § 67.
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The English rule is illustrated in the case of In re European Bank. Ex parte Oriental Commercial Bank.6" In
this case, one Demetrio Pappa purchased negotiable paper
with funds belonging to the Oriental Commercial Bank and
sold the same to the Eastern Commercial Bank after maturity. The Oriental Bank claimed the proceeds of the
paper. The court adopted the statement of Sir R. Malins,
V.C., as laid down in Ex parte Swan " as follows:
"It is said that the indorsee of a bill which is over due takes it sub-

ject to all the equities. Perhaps a better expression would be ....
that he takes the bill subject to all its equities 'that is, the equities
of the bill, not the equities of the parties.' . . . The indorsee of an
over due bill takes it subject to all the equities that attach to the
bill itself in the hands of the holder when it was due; but he does
not take it subject to claims arising out of collateral matters, such
as the statutory right of set-off."

The judgment was in favor of the Oriental Bank. The
English rule therefore would be that maturity of a negotiable instrument operates as constructive notice, not only
of equitable defenses but also of equities of ownership.
There are decisions adopting the same rule in the United
States. In Mayer v. Bank 63 a trustee of over due negotiable paper sold it to an innocent purchaser. It was held
that the paper could be replevied by the cestui. The court
held that an indorsee after maturity stands in the shoes
of his indorser. In Kernokan v. Durham 66 the payee sold
a note to the plaintiff but instead of delivering it to him
he delivered a forged copy. The genuine note was sold to
the defendant, a bona fide purchaser after maturity. The
note was held subject to the plaintiff's equity in the defendant's hands. Under decisions such as these, it is plain
that the courts regard past due instruments as choses in
action applying the maxim: "Where there are equal equities,
the first in point of time will prevail."
5 Ch. App. 358, 39 L. J. Ch. 588, 22 L. T. 422, 18 W. R. 474, L. J. (1870).
64 L. R. 6 Eq. 344, 18 L. T. 230, 16 W. R. 560 (1868).
65 86 Mo. App. 108 (1900).
66 48 Oh. St. 1 (1891).
63
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There are a few decisions contrary to those cited in next
preceding paragraph. In Sanderson v. Crane 17 the payee
who had passed through insolvency withheld a note from his
assignee. After maturity of the note, he sold the same to
a bona fide purchaser. The court held that the note was
not affected with equities in favor of the assignee. In
Crosby v. Tanner"8 a note was held by Tanner which was
subject to an equity in favor of one Melhop. After maturity of the note Tanner sold the same to the plaintiff, a bona
fide purchaser. Melhop asserted that the note was subject
to his equity, but the court said:
"The position is based upon the familiar doctrine that the transfer

of a negotiable instrument, after maturity, is governed by the rules
applicable to the assignment of a chose in action, which divests no
equity affecting it while in the hands of the assignor. But the rule

is not applicable to the case before us, for the reason that the equities,
which survive the assignment, are those which are between the parties
to the instrument, and not those between the assignor and one not a
party."

The court seemed to regard the instrument as a chose but
applied Chancellor Kent's doctrine of latent equities as set
out in Murray v. Syburn. 9 In Moore v. Moore o the indorsement of the note in question was secured by fraud,
and the title came to a bona fide purchaser after maturity.
In delivering the opinion of the court, Justice Mitchell said:
"It is familiar law that if the owner, although induced thereto by
fraud, invests another with the apparent legal title to chattels, in

pursuance of a contract, the person so clothed may transfer an unimpeachable title to a good-faith purchaser. . . . We are unable to
discover any good reason for a distinction in that regard between
chattels and such instruments as may be assigned by endorsement,

so as to give the assignee a complete legal title."
In Young Men's Christian Ass'n Gymnasium Co. v. Ford
Nat. Bank " negotiable notes belonging to the Christian As67
68

14 N. J. L. 506- (1834).
40 Iowa 136 (1874).

69

2 John. Ch. 441 (1817).
112 Ind. 149, 13 N. E. 673 (1887).
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sociation were pledged as collateral security. The pledgee
sold the same to the bank after maturity. The Association
brought an action against the bank to establish its equity
in the notes. The judgment was for the bank. The judgment was based upon the following statement of law:
"The equitable principle which underlies this doctrine, and which is
universally admitted to be just and sound, is that if a loss occurs, by
which one of two innocent persons must suffer, that one should sustain the loss who has most trusted the party through whom the loss

came."

These cases illustrate the difficulties which the courts faced
in attempting to determine the status of a purchaser of past
due negotiable paper before the enactment of the Negotiable
Instrument Act. As noted some courts took the position
that past due negotiable paper was a chose in action and
applied the rules governing assignments of choses. Other
courts regarded it as a chose and accepted Kent's theory
of latent equities. Other courts regarded the instrument
as a chattel and applied the general property rules of a
transfer. Still other courts decided the cases on the theory
of estoppel.
The Negotiable Instrument Act contains the following
provision: 72
"In the hands of any holder other than a holder in due course, a
negotiable instrument is subject to the same defenses as if it were nonnegotiable. But a holder who derives his title through a holder in due
course, and who is not himself a party to any fraud or illegality
affecting the instrument, has all the righfs of such former holder in
respect of all parties prior to the latter."

It would seem that under this provision the Negotiable
Instrument Act has adopted the English rule as explained
in In re European Bank," if defenses be construed to include equitable defenses and equities of ownership; hence
overdue commercial paper either carries with it constructive notice of all equitable defenses and equities of owner72

73

N. I. L., § 58.
Supra note 63.
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ship or it is treated as a chose in action. In the latter alternative, the courts would refuse to accept the theory of
latent equities. In Deuters v. Townsend 7 Cockburn, C.J.,
says:
"The only consequence of indorsing a bill after it is due is, that what-

ever would have been a defense to an action on the bill in the hands
of the transferor is equally so to one in the hands of the transferee."
The indorsee after maturity may sue on the instrument.
Remembering the rule as to assigning choses in action, it
would seem that the correct basis for explaining the rule
in In re European Bank " is that a negotiable instrument
past due carries constructive notice of all equities. A purchaser after maturity, therefore, could not be a bona fide
purchaser.
Cases dealing with the rights of a purchaser of past due
negotiable paper decided under the Negotiable Instrument
Act may be considered under the following subdivisions:
Defenses existing at the time of transfer in favor of the
primary obligor against the transferor.
Defenses in favor of the primary obligor arising subsequent to the transfer.
Defenses in favor of the payee indorser.
Equitable claims to ownership of the paper.
Set-offs and counterclaims.
First, as to cases where the primary obligor had a defense
against the transferor at time of transfer: In Guthrie v.
Moore " a note was given by the purchaser of land to the
vendor, secured by a purchase money mortgage. Held, that
an agreement that the note was not to be enforced against
the maker until prior liens against the land had been discharged by the vendor could be set up against the indorsee
74 5 B. & S. 613, 4 New Rep. 272, 33L.
,
(1864).
75 Supra note 63.
76 108 S. E. 334 (N. C. 1921).
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after maturity, the notes being past due, the defendant took
the notes subject to and with notice of any equities and defenses existing in favor of the maker. The defense here it
seems would be conditional delivery.
In Farmers' and Merchants' Bank v. Siemers " a payee
who was trustee after maturity sold the instrument to a
bona fide purchaser. After holding that the facts showed
actual notice, the court said:
"A holder taking a note after maturity takes it subject to all equities

with which it was incumbered in the hands of the transferor, whether
he has notice of them or not."
In Woulfe v. Douglas Storage Van and Express Co." a
note executed by the defendant was sold to a foreign corporation in Illinois, which had not complied with the Foreign Corporation Act of this state. After maturity, the
corporation sold the note to the plaintiff. The position assumed by the defendant was since the foreign corporation,
which held the note at maturity, could not have recovered
on the note, the plaintiff, the indorsee of the corporation
could not recover. The court gave judgment for the plaintiff without referring to the Negotiable Instrument Act.
The court rested its decision on Young Men's Christian
Ass'n Gymnasium Co. v. Rockford Nat. Bank 11 and on Justice v. Stonecipher.8" Quoting from the former case:
"When we speak of equities between the parties it is not to be understood by this expression that all sorts of equities existing between the
parties from other independent transactions between them are intended,
but only such equities as attach to the particular note, and, as between
those parties, would be available to control, qualify, or extinguish any
rights arising thereon."
77 242 S. W. 417, (Mo. 1922); In Greenlees v. Chezik, 190 Pac. 667 (Colo.
1920), the indorser took after maturity. Court held that the indorsee would
be subject to a defense of payment. In Graves v. Burch, 181 Pac. 354 (Wyo.
1919), the facts were such that the payee was not equitably entitled to recover
the attorney's fees stipulated for in the note. Held, the holder taking from the
payee after maturity could not collect the attorney's fees on the note.
78 232 11.
App. 230 (1924).
79 Supra note 71.
80 267 Ill. 448, 108 N. E. 722 (1915).
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In Illinois, it would therefore seem that Chancellor Kent's
doctrine of latent equities is still the law on the subject under discussion.
In Schlamp v. Manewal 81 Manewal signed a note for the
accommodation of Schlamp with the understanding that
Schlamp was to use the note to raise money. After maturity, Schlamp transferred the note to the plaintiff as payment
for stock. Judgment was rendered for Schlamp, the court
holding that the plaintiff was in no better position than he
would have been had he acquired the note before maturity
knowing of all defenses available to defendant.
In Robichaux v. Block 2 Block executed a note to one
Martel without consideration for the amount of $77.50.
This note was secured by a mortgage with an agreement
that Martel was to use the note in securing a loan from the
St. Mary's Bank and Trust Company. After maturity the
note was seized on a fi. fa. and sold to plaintiff. Court held
that the defenses of want of consideration was good against
the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff was subject to all equities
and defenses which defendant could have urged against
Martel.
In Beneficial Loan Ass'n v. Hillery 11 Hillery executed a
note to the Continental Banking and Trust Company as payment for stock in said company. The company retained
the stock as security for the note. After maturity the note
and stock were transferred to plaintiff as security for a loan.
The payee company failed. Judgment was for the plaintiff
on the note. In the course of the opinion the court said:
"The holder of a promissory note which comes into his hands after
maturity takes it subject to all legal defenses which the maker may
have against its enforcement."

It will be noted that the court limited its statement to defenses, saying nothing about equities of ownership.
81 190 S. W. 658 (Mo. 19i6).
82 81 So. 371 (La. 1919).

88 113 Ad. 324 (N.

3. 1921).
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In Gibson v. Gillespie 84 the plaintiff, after maturity, acquired the note from the payee. The maker's defense was
that he had executed the note for the accommodation of the
payee. The court stated:
"A note assigned when overdue is subject in the hands of the assignee,
to every infirmity which it had when in the hands of the payee. One
who takes negotiable paper after maturity takes subject to every
defense which could have been urged when the paper was in the hands
of the original payee. Absence or failure of consideration is matter of
defense as against any person not a holder in due course."

In Farmers' Bank of Camarillo v. Goodrich 815the payee
negotiated a note after maturity to the plaintiff under such
circumstances that the transfer constituted a fraud on the
defendant, maker. Held, the plaintiff was subject to all
defenses that the payee was subject to.
In Crife v. Wade 86 the plaintiff brought suit on a note acquired by him from the payee after maturity. Defendant
asked that the note be delivered up and cancelled on ground
of fraud, conditional delivery, and failure of consideration.
Held, that there was no danger that the note might come
into the hands of an innocent purchaser for it was past due
and subject to all the equities and defenses that might be
considered as against the plaintiff. Cancellation was refused.
In Cunning v. Locke 87 the note was indorsed to the plaintiff after maturity. The court said:
"The plaintiff took it dishonored, but none the less it could be sold
and transferred and recovery had thereon if the defenses failed. So
far as the indorsement is concerned, it is sufficient to pass title."

In First Nat. Bank in Alexandria, S.D., v. Ernst 88 the
question was whether the defendant, Rau F. Ernst, who
had signed the note as surety for her husband was liable on
84
85

86
87
88

152
266
261
258
219

At. 589 (Del. 1928).
Pac. 350 (Colo. 1928).
Pac. 72 (Or. 1927).
Pac. 192 (Or. 1927).
N. W. 798 (Neb. 1928).
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the note under the Nebraska law, the plaintiff acquiring the
note after maturity. It was held that one taking a note
after maturity is not an innocent purchaser. The court apparently adopting the theory of constructive notice.
In Dunn v. Cutley89 the defendant executed the note in
question for the accommodation of one Arthur L'Hommedieu. The holder at maturity was subject to an estopped in
favor of the defendant. After maturity the note was transferred to the plaintiff for sole purpose of bringing suit
thereon. Held, that the plaintiff was subject to the estoppel.
In Westchester Mortg. Co. v. Newport Trust Co.90 the
court held that a purchaser after maturity was subject to any
defense available to the maker if the note had remained in
the hands of the payee.
In Bradford Realty Corporationv. Beetz " the court held
that a purchaser after maturity takes the instrument subject
to such defenses as may have existed at the time of the
transfer.
In Pacific-Southwest Trust & Savings Bank v. Valley
Finance Corporation9 the court clearly treats an overdue
instrument as a chose in action. After referring to section
58 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, the court proceeds as
follows:
"Section 1459 provided: 'A non-negotiable written contract for the
payment of money . .

.

. may be transferred. .

.

.Such indorsement

shall transfer all the rights of the assignor under the instrument to.
the assignee, subject to all equities and defenses existing in favor of
the maker at the time of the indorsement.' Section 953 provided: 'A
thing in action is a right to recover money . . . by a judicial pro-

ceeding.' Section 368, Code of Civil Procedure, provided: 'In the
case of an assignment of a thing in action, the action by the assignee
is without prejudice to any set-off, or other defense existing at the
time of, or before, notice of the assignment. . "
151 AtI. 367 (N. J. 1930).
90 146 At. 174 (R. L 1929).
91 142 Ad. 395 (Conn. 1928).
92 280 Pac. 134 (Cal. 1929).
89
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This interpretation not only subjects the purchaser after
maturity to defenses and equities in the instrument but also
to collateral equities, such as, a set-off.
As to cases involving defenses in favor of the primary
obligor, arising subsequent to the transfer:
In England the case of Milnes v. Dawson " sets out the
true situation. In this case the defendant was sued as acceptor. He set up as a defense that the payee indorsed
the bill to the plaintiff without any consideration and that
after maturity he had paid the bill to the payee. In the
course of the opinion the court expressed its opinion as follows:
"It would be altogether inconsistent with the negotiability of these
instruments, to hold, that after the indorser has transferred the property in the instrument, he may, by receiving the amount of it, affect
the right of his indorsee. When the property in the bill is passed,
the right to sue upon the bill follows also. .

.

. A bill of exchange

is a chattel, and the gift is complete by delivery coupled with the intention to give."

Although the bill was not shown to have been transferred
to the plaintiff after maturity, the plaintiff was, of course, not
a holder in due course. So it would seem that the reasoning here would be applicable to a bill transferred after
maturity.
In New York, the law was well stated in First Nat. Bank
of Champlain v. Wood. 4 In this case the plaintiffs were
donees. Speaking of the transaction the court said:
"It is admitted that the donees might at that time have maintained an
action against the makers on the notes, and recovered thereon. If so,
it could only be upon the ground that they had become the owners of
the notes. They became such owners only by virtue of a voluntary gift,
accompanied by an immediate and unconditional delivery. This, indeed, did give to the donees a perfect title and absolute ownership
to and in the notes, as there were then no equities existing between the
original parties. .
93
94

.

. How is it, then, that such ownership, although

155 Eng. Rep. 413, 5 Ex. 947 (1850).
27 N. E. 1020 (N. Y. 1891).
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absolute at the time of the transfer, and giving the holders of the
notes a right of action, shall nevertheless, if not acted on by collecting
the money, be liable at any future time to be changed, andX indeed
extinguished, by matters subsequently arising between those original
parties? . . . People who receive gifts of negotiable securities take
them subject to all equities then existing between the original parties,
but not subject to all which may thereafter, and while they are absolute owners of such securities, exist between those parties."

As to cases decided since the Negotiable Instrument Act:
In Greer v. Orchard " one Graves, was the payee of a note.
The note was purchased by the plaintiff's husband who directed Graves to transfer it to his wife, the plaintiff. Subsequently the money due on the note was paid to the plaintiff's husband. It was not shown that the husband had
authority to act as the plaintiff's agent. The judgment was
for the defendant. The court reasoned that the plaintiff
was not a holder in due course, saying:
"'A gift of a negotiable instrument of a third party is not such a
negotiation of it in the usual course of business as to give the donee
the full protection which is extended a bona fide holder for value.' The
reason for the rule which protects a bona fide purchaser for value and
makes it applicable to commercial paper is absent in case of a gift of
such paper from one person to another, where the purchaser and
donor is familiar with all of the facts affecting the condition of the
note."

There seemed to be no doubt as to the husband's intention
to make a gift to the plaintiff, and that the latter was the
complete owner of the note against which the maker had
no defense at the time of the execution and transfer to
the plaintiff. The decision results in placing a power in the
donor to extinguish the right of the donor against the obligor, a rather startling result in general property law. Although the preceding cases did not involve transfers after
maturity, the holder was not a holder in due course and it
seems that in cases of transfers after maturity the reasoning in cases would be applicable.
95

161 S. W. 875 (Mo. 1913).
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In Clark v. Wheeler " the payee transferred a note to the
plaintiff after maturity. Subsequent to the transfer, the
defendant paid the note to the payee. Judgment was for
the plaintiff. The court said:
"But payment to the original payee after transfer and delivery of the
note is no defense against the transferee, although he acquired the note
after maturity. .

.

. A note, though overdue, is still negotiable ...

The indorsee, taking it after maturity, can sue on it in his own name.
The payor, having made the paper negotiable, cannot assume that it
has not been transferred, although he has defaulted in his contract
of payment. Paying the note, he has the right to have the note given
up, or his partial payment indorsed."

The court further says that:
"Section 51 of the Negotiable Instrument Act provides that payment
to a holder in due course discharges the instrument. No suggestion is
found in the act that payment to any other than the legal holder will
discharge it." 97

In Johnson v. People's Bank " it was doubtful as to when
the plaintiff acquired the note; however the court held
"Where a promissory note is acquired by a transferee after
its maturity, the transferee does not take it subject to a
defense by the maker against the payee arising after the
transfer of the note."
As to defenses in favor of the payee indorser:
In Webb v. Rice 11 Webb, the payee of a note indorsed it
in blank and gave it to his bank for collection. After maturity the bank sold it to Mrs. Rice. Mrs. Rice brought
suit against Webb as indorser. The court held that Mrs.
Rice obtained no title to the note, the reason being that
since she purchased after maturity, she took it subject to
all defenses which could arise on the note, and that she got
only such title as the bank had, which was only the authority
121 Atl. 588 (N. H. 1923).
Section 88 of the N. I. L. provides: "Payment is made in due course
when it is made at or after the maturity of the instrument to the holder thereof
in good faith and without notice that his title is defective."
98
137 S. E. 104 (Ga. 1927).
99 97 So. 419 (Miss. 1923).
98

97

PAST DUE COMMERCIAL PAPER

to collect the note and not to sell it. The bank, however,
must have had the legal title since it was the holder and indorsee of the instrument which still remained negotiable.
Title did pass to the plaintiff, even though it was defective.
The statement therefore that plaintiff did not have title appears too broad.
As to equitable claims to ownership of the paper:
In Justice v. Stonecipher 100 Justice, payee and owner of
notes, indorsed them in blank and intrusted them with
Stonecipher. The latter was to collect the interest during
absence of Justice. After maturity Stonecipher pledged
them with the Bridgeport State Bank as security for a loan.
Justice brought an action against the Bank and Stonecipher
to recover the notes. The court gave judgment for the
Bank. To the defendant's position that Stonecipher's title
was defective under section 55 of the Negotiable Instrument
Act,' and that, as a result, the defendant bank must, under section 59 of the Negotiable Instrument Act,1 2 sustain
the burden of proving himself a holder in due course under
section 52 of the Negotiable Instrument Act,'03 the court
answered:
100

267 11.448, 108 N. E, 722 (1915).
101 Section 55 of the N. I. L. provides: "The title of a person who negotiates an instrument is defective within the meaning of this act when he obtained
the instrument, or any signature thereto, by fraud, duress, or force and fear,
or other unlawful means, or for an illegal consideration, or when he negotiates
it in breach of faith, or under such circumstances as amount to a fraud."
102 Section 59 of the N. I. L. provides: "Every holder is deemed prima
fade to be a holder in due course; but when it is shown that the title of any
person who has negotiated the instrument was defective, the burden is on the
holder to prove that he or some person under whom he claims acquired the
title as a holder in due course. But the last-mentioned rule does not apply
in favor of a party who became bound on the instrument prior to !he acquisition of such defective title.'
108 Section 52 of the N. I. L. provides: "A holder in due course is a
holder who has taken the instrument under the following conditions:
1. That it is complete and regular upon its face; or
2. That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and witnout
notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact; or
3. That he took it in gooin faith and for value; or
4. That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any
infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it."
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"Such a construction of said section 59 would render it meaningless.
It is apparent, when the section is read in connection with all the
other sections in that article, that it means to place the burden upon
the holder to prove that he, or some person under whom he claims,
comes within the provision of the fourth clause of the statutory definition of a holder in due course; that is, that the burden is then upon
him to show that at the time the instrument was negotiated to him he
had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the
title of the person negotiating it."

It is hard to see on what grounds other sub-divisions of section 52 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, especially part
(2), were ignored. It has been suggested that the case must
either be rested upon an estoppel or in the alternative to
treat sections 52 and 59 of the Negotiable Instrument Act
as intending to apply only to defenses to obligations on the
instrument, whether of parties primarily or secondarily liable,
and leaving the cases of equitable claims to ownership to
instruments to be dealt with as omitted cases under section 196 104 of the Negotiable Instrument Act. °5
In Priest v. Garnett 106 Priest, the payee and owner of the
note in question indorsed it in blank and delivered it to one
Garnett. After maturity, Garnett, although having no
authority to sell the note, sold it to the defendant. Priest
brought replevin against Wood. Judgment was for the
defendant. The court said:
"If the true owner of a negotiable note overdue, or of a non-negotiable
note, clothes another with the usual evidences of ownership, or with
full power of disposition, and third persons are led into dealing with
such apparent owner, they will be protected in their dealings."

In Hoidale v. Cooley 107 one Maginnis acted as agent for
the Northern American Life & Casualty Company. He took
a negotiable note as payment for premiums. He was en104

Section 196 of the N. I. L. provides: "In any case not provided for in

this act the rules of the law merchant shall govern."
105 Suggested by Professor Chafee, BRANNON'S NEGOTIABLE
(4th ed.) 505.
106
107

191 S. W. 1048 (Mo. 1917).
174 N. W. 413 (Minn. 1919).
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titled to seventy percent of the note and the company to
thirty percent. After maturity of the note, he sold the
same to the plaintiff. As against the company, the court
held that the plaintiff did not have title to the note and
judgment was for the company.
In Bacon v. Reichardt "I the defendant purchased a note
' after maturity, after the payee had received payment. The
court held that the note was discharged.
In Wilkinson v. Love 109 one J. L. Wilkinson was the payee
of a note which was secured by a deed of trust. Mrs. M.
C. Wilkinson was the maker of the note. The maker transferred the note to a bank before maturity and for value.
At maturity the payee and the bank agreed that a new note,
executed by the maker and secured by a deed of trust, should
be taken by the bank as payment of the first note. The
second note was accordingly executed and received by the
bank and the first note and trust deed surrendered by the
bank to the payee, but was not marked paid. The payee
then, transferred the first note to M. L. Wilkinson, a bona
fide purchaser, after maturity and for value. The question
was whether the deed securing the first note or the deed
securing the second note deserved priority on the maker's
property. The court held that priority should be given to
the trust deed securing the first note. In the opinion it was
stated:
"Through the admitted gross negligence of the officials of the bank,
this note and duly recorded deed of trust were placed in the hands
of the payee in the instruments, without any sort of mark or notation
thereon to indicate that they had been paid or in any manner satisfied
or canceled, or that the lien of the deed of trust was not what it purported on its face and upon the records-a valid, subsisting, first lien
on the property conveyed thereby.
"Under these facts there are two principles which we consider
applicable, either of which would require a reversal of the decree of

the court below.
108 208 S.W. 24 (Mo. 1918).
109

115 So. 707 (Miss. 1928).
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"The note which the bank surrendered to the payee, J. L. Wilkinson, although overdue, was negotiable, and it seems to be the settled
rule that the assignee of overdue negotiable paper takes it with notice
of all the equities or defenses which the maker may have, but he does
not take it with notice of the secret equities of third parties, or those
arising out of collateral transactions."

The court further said:
"Chancellor Kent, speaking of this rule in this class of cases, says:
'The assignee can always go to the debtor and ascertain what claims
he may have against the bond or other chose in action which he is
about purchasing from the obligee, but he may not be able with the
utmost diligence to ascertain the latent equity of some third person
against the obligee.'"

The court also held that the doctrine of estoppel was applicable, as evidenced from the following words:
"By the neglect of these officers, these instruments were placed in the
hands of the payee of the note in such form and condition that he
was thereby clothed with the apparent authority to negotiate the note
and security.. . . we think the loss, if any, resulting from the negligence
of its officers, must be borne by the bank."

As to set-offs and counterclaims:
The case of Burrough v. Moss .o illustrates the common
law rule as to set-offs. In this case, a promissory note was
made by the defendant which was payable to one Fearn,
and by him indorsed to the plaintiff. After it became due,
the defendant maintained he had a right to set off, against
the plaintiff's claim, a debt due him from Fearn, who held
the note at the date of maturity. It was held that the defendant had no right of set-off. Bayley, J., said:
"I agree with them in thinking, that the indorsee of an overdue bill
or note is liable to such equities only as attach on the bill or note
itself, and not to claims arising out of collateral matters."

Parke, J. was of the opinion that: "If there is an agreement, either express or implied, affecting the note, that is
an equity which attaches upon it, and is available against
any person who takes it when overdue"; it can be set off.
"But it does not thence follow, that a right depending en110 109 Eng. Rep. 558, 10 B. and C. 558 (1830).
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tirely on the Statute of Set-Off is applicable to such a state
of things."
In the absence of special statutes, the English rule is the
general rule in the United States.
In Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen "l the court expressed
its opinion as follows:
"The general rule, or, perhaps, the common law rule, followed by the
Supreme Court of the United States, is stated by Mr. Justice Swayne
as follows: 'The transferee of overdue negotiable paper takes it liable
to all the equities to which it was subject in the hands of the payee,
but those equities must attach to the paper itself, and not arise from
any collateral transaction. A debt due to the maker from the payee
at the time of the transfer cannot be set off in a suit by the endorsee
of the payee, although it might have been enforced if the suit had
been brought by the latter.'"
In some jurisdictions the question is covered specifically
by statute. The rule in New York is an example and is
as follows:"' 2
"If the action is upon a negotiable promissory note or bill of exchange
which has been assigned to the plaintiff after it became due, a demand,
existing against a person who has assigned or transferred it, after it
became due, must be allowed as a counter claim to the amount of the
plaintiff's demand, if it might have been so allowed against the assignor, while the note or bill belonged to him."
In cases of counterclaims, the defendant's cause of action
does not arise out of collateral matters but out of the same
transaction which gave origin to the note sued on or out

of an agreement affecting the note.

The note is conse-

quently subject to an equity in favor of the maker when
the note is purchased after maturity. In Parks, Campbell,
Findley Motor Co. v. Wolverton "' Wolverton purchased a
car from the payee of the check sued on. The car was
not as represented by the payee and the check was dishonored. After dishonor, the check was sold to the plainIll 279 Fed. 488 (1922).
112 N. Y. CODE Civ. PROC. (1920) § 502.
118 230 Pac. 863 (OkI. 1924).
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tiff, who knew of the dishonor. Held, that the defendant
could file a cross petition in the nature of a counterclaim
as a defense to an action on the check.
Conclusion: The foregoing review of the cases show that
despite the uniformity of the Negotiable Instrument Act
the law as to the rights acquired by a purchaser of overdue
negotiable paper is not uniform. In practically all jurisdictions, equitable defenses to liabilities on the contracts,
good against the holder at maturity, will be good against
a purchaser acquiring after maturity. The conflict of authority arises when there are conflicting legal or equitable
claims of ownership to the paper. Here one line of authorities take the position that the bona fide purchaser after
maturity takes the instrument subject to the adverse claims
to ownership. On the other hand, there is a line of cases
holding that the bona fide purchaser, after maturity, is not
subject to the adverse claims of ownership. The cases subjecting the bona fide purchaser to opposing claims to ownership do so on the theory that the transfer of the past due
instrument is subject to the same rules as the transfer of
other personal property, that is, that one who buys it, even
though bona fide, from one having no title acquires none.
The cases protecting the bona fide purchaser after maturity
proceed upon the theory that the true owner who clothes
the assignor with the usual apparent indices of title is
estopped from asserting his claim against the bona fide purchaser.
It seems to the writer that in the ultimate solution of the
question, the common law doctrines as to assignability of
choses in action should not be permitted to have an undue
influence. These doctrines were worked out largely during
a non-commercial age, when the great majority of property
rights were represented by rights to tangible chattels and
to real estate. At the present time, a large percentage of
property rights consist of contractual rights, as witness the
files of any of our financial institutions. At present we are
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far from the day when the contractual relation was regarded as purely personal. In the development of the law
pertaining to the non-negotiable contracts, we have noticed,
first, the rule as inalienability; second, the express power of
attorney; third, the implied power of attorney; fourth, the
real party in interest statutes; and finally, the recommendations submitted by the authors of the Restatement of the
Law of Contracts. Surely the general progress of the law
and commercial needs should be taken into consideration in
the decision of the question under discussion. The courts
subjecting the purchaser of past due paper to all equities
do so on the theory that the assignee has no title. It is
believed that this is error. Past due paper is still negotiable
and the holder of to bearer, or indorsee of to order paper,
has the title and is not merely an agent. It is therefore
submitted that as an aid to alienability, always an important characteristic, and uniformity in the general property
law, the title of the purchaser of past due negotiable instruments should be recognized, and, facts should be applied
permitting the following maxim: "Where there is equal
equity, the law must prevail." This may be done by interpreting the word, "defenses," in section fifty-eight of
the Negotiable Instrument Act to include only defenses to
contracts on the instrument, leaving equitable claims to
ownership to be determined by the general property rules.' 14
Elton E. Richter.
assisted by
Joseph R. Yoch.
University of Notre Dame, College of Law.
114 Professor Chafee has suggested that section 58 of the N. L L. be
amended to read as follows: "A holder who has taken the instrument in compliance fvlth the first, third, and fourth conditions of section fifty-two is under
no obligation to surrender the instrument or account for its proceeds bLcause
of the defective title of any prior party, and such holder may enfQrce payment
of the instrument for the full amount thereof against all parties !hereon, except persons who have defenses of their own, or who sign for the accomodation of any person and are allowed by law to avail themselves of defenses of
such accommodated person."

